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ABSTRACT
State of the art deep learning techniques are known to be vulner-
able to evasion aacks where an adversarial sample is generated
from a malign sample and misclassied as benign. Detection of
encrypted malware command and control trac based on TCP/IP
ow features can be framed as a learning task and is thus vulner-
able to evasion aacks. However, unlike e.g. in image processing
where generated adversarial samples can be directly mapped to
images, going from ow features to actual TCP/IP packets requires
craing the sequence of packets, with no established approach for
such craing and a limitation on the set of modiable features that
such craing allows. In this paper we discuss learning and evasion
consequences of the gap between generated and craed adversarial
samples. We exemplify with a deep neural network detector trained
on a public C2 trac dataset, white-box adversarial learning, and a
proxy-based approach for craing longer ows. Our results show 1)
the high evasion rate obtained by using generated adversarial sam-
ples on the detector can be signicantly reduced when using craed
adversarial samples; 2) robustness against adversarial samples by
model hardening varies according to the craing approach and cor-
responding set of modiable features that the aack allows for; 3)
incrementally training hardened models with adversarial samples
can produce a level playing eld where no detector is best against
all aacks and no aack is best against all detectors, in a given set of
aacks and detectors. To the best of our knowledge this is the rst
time that level playing eld feature set- and iteration-hardening
are analyzed in encrypted C2 malware trac detection.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Security and privacy → Intrusion/anomaly detection and
malwaremitigation; •Computingmethodologies→Machine
learning;
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Detecting encrypted malware command and control trac using
machine learning and trac characteristics is important – espe-
cially for zero-day aacks or when aackers frequently change
black-listed items such as IP addresses or server-side certicates.
However, machine learning algorithms are known to be vulnerable
to adversarial aacks and it is only natural that aackers would
explore this vulnerability and modify the behavior of C2 trac
between victim and C2 server to make detection harder. But mal-
ware development is costly. Even with a large set of open source
malware frameworks to choose from, modifying the behavior of
complex code in order to achieve specic adversarial trac can
be a task with daunting impact on the prot of most operations.
Applying trac proxies or addons to the source code that do not
modify the behavior of the malware but can modify trac features
can be a more aractive, lower cost solution. Deploying modied
malware on the C2 server and even on victims seems to be a com-
parably easier problem with mechanisms available for overwriting
old payloads with new ones on the victims.
We take these constraints as the motivation for this paper. Figure
1 illustrates an aack and defense architecture compatible with
these constraints. e adversarial proxies or addons in the C2 server
and the victim monitor the trac between the original malware
and C2 server, and when necessary – for example just before the
end of the TCP connection – delay or add packets thus modifying
trac characteristics that do not change the behavior of the original
malware and hopefully can break the detector. e detector, siing
in one end of the Intrusion Detection System, complements existing
rule-basedmodules in the IDS by detecting yet-to-blacklist C2 trac
with a machine learning model.
C2 HostC2 TLS Flow 
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Figure 1: Proxy-based modication of TLS C2 ows.
While aackers are said to be always more motivated than de-
fenders, our approach in this paper is to try and set a level playing
eld between aacker and defender. Both aacker and defender
start from a common public dataset and we set out to understand
what happens when each develops their own strategy and these
strategies collide. In particular we try to look at aacker and de-
fender performance for dierent setups of the aacker and defender
– namely what happens if a set of features is used for aacking and
another set of features for hardening the model, and if the aacker
goes through more or less hardening and aacking steps than the
defender. Although we do not explicitly use proxy models for the
aacker to generate adversarial samples, recent work [6] points to
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adversarial aacks transferring from one model to another – in our
case we assume the deep learning model structure and the original
training data is the same for aacker and defender.
e remaining of this section lays out assumptions for the under-
lying trac, datasets, and limitations to howmuch the malware can
be changed. Section 2 describes the dataset that we use in the paper.
Section 3 describes the deep learning model used for detection, the
method used for generating adversarial samples, an example cra-
ing technique to increase the duration of the ow in actual packet
traces, and performance results for the defender under aacks with
dierent craing and feature set limitations. Sections 4 and 5 ex-
plore the level playing eld clash between aacker and defender,
with dierent possibilities for aacker and defender strategies in
hardening and iterating through aack-hardening steps to improve
detector resilience and adversarial sample impact. We conclude
with a review of the state of the art in section 6 and nal notes in
section 7.
1.1 Assumptions
1.1.1 TLS traic. Deep packet inspection and signature-based
techniques can be used to detect plaintext C2 trac, but are of
limited usefulness for encrypted trac. Certicate- and cipher
suite-based techniques have been proposed to detect encrypted
malware [3], but are not robust against C2 servers changing cer-
ticates and ciphers. Here we assume some other approaches will
be used for detecting plaintext C2 trac and ltering black-listed
server IPs and certicates, but that frequently changing certicates
will require a detector that focuses on the characteristics of TLS
trac.
1.1.2 Models built on publicly available datasets and tools. We
limit our analysis to a dataset that is publicly available to both the
defender and the aacker. is allows the aacker to build a proxy
model and develop their aack from the proxy model if the actual
model is not available. We consider both cases where the defender
model is available to the aacker (e.g. if it was stolen) and where
a proxy model is built from the publicly available data that the
defender used. We do not consider the case where data from the
same malware is captured from other environments and used by
the aacker.
1.1.3 Limitations to how much the malware can be changed. We
assume the malware developer is unwilling or unable to change the
code for the main functionality of the malware. In this case there are
two options for changing C2 trac: 1) a proxy-like approach that
works in the non-TLS part of the communications, e.g. increasing
the duration of the ow by hanging on to the FIN/ACK packets at
the end of the ow long enough to reach the larger ow duration
adversarial target; 2) adding adversarial code at the end of the
original malware code that does not change the original code but
that sends additional TLS records which the C2 server receives
but ignores, adding to the byte and packet count but also possibly
changing duration. Figure 1 illustrates the proxy-like aack. is
assumption is strong and we expect to address weaker assumptions
in future work namely using open source command and control
frameworks like Metasploit that we can rewrite and use to more
closely resemble the target ow features.
2 MALWARE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS DATASET
2.1 Scraping
We use data from hps://malware-trac-analysis.net (MTA), which
contains recent, vast, and detailed content related to common mal-
ware families. e malware is ran in sandboxed environment and
specic malware infections are described, many of them providing
.pcap les containing captured network trac associated to the
infection and to the C2 communication. Aer scraping the website,
508 les were obtained, corresponding to captures from 2016 to
2019. Table 1 describes the years and statistics of the data we used.
Although each .pcap le has the date on which it was added to the
MTAwebsite, in a real network we could have trac from older and
newer malware families coexisting and because of that and of the
small number of ows in our dataset we do not further distinguish
malware based on year or malware family.
year # les fetched # TCP ows # TLS % TLS
2016 109 1213 58 4.782%
2017 141 3168 885 27.936%
2018 147 24854 11590 46.632%
2019 111 39286 8214 20.908%
total 508 68521 20747 30.278%
Table 1: Per year statistics of the MTA les we fetched.
2.2 Labeling individual C2 ows
We used the SSL Blacklist project1 list of SSL/TLS certicates em-
ployed by botnet C2 servers, and congured it on Suricata2 with
rules to identify malicious TLS ows. Table 2 shows how the 7672
malicious TLS ows are distributed per black-listed malware fam-
ily certicates. We considered the remaining 13075 TLS ows as
normal.
Family Flow count
TrickBot 4984
PandaZeuS 1610
Gozi 436
IcedID 374
Dridex 131
AKBuilder 56
IcedId 56
Others (< 50 ows) 25
Table 2: Number of C2 TLS ows per malware family
2.3 Class imbalance and training-test split
We use all of the malicious TLS ows in the MTA dataset and
randomly take the same number of normal TLS ows to create a
balanced dataset. From this, we randomly take 20% for testing. If
capturing data on a real network, the imbalance between normal
1hps://sslbl.abuse.ch
2hps://suricata-ids.org
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and malicious would be much larger and the test set should reect
this imbalance. We plan to consider class imbalance in future work
where we setup real network data capture.
2.4 Obtaining ow features
We use TStat [16] to extract 86 numerical features from trac ows,
including the total number of packets observed from the client or
server and the duration of the ow. We ignore incomplete ows
as dened by Tstat. Table 3 lists the specic features3 we used.
ese are mostly numerical. We normalize features between 0 and
1 by dividing by the maximum value for the feature in the training
set and square rooting: f in =
√
f i/f imax . Features in the test data
whose value is larger than f imax are set to 1.
Figure 2 shows the boxtplot of the normalized feature values in
our training dataset for malicious and benign TLS ows. Approxi-
mately half of the features have low entropy and the limited range
of values they take can be observed on the boxplots. e remaining
features have a more dynamic range and higher entropy. We can
also observe that there are some dierences between the C2 and
non-C2 ranges of values for some features, which could help detect
malicious TLS ows.
Figure 3 shows malicious and normal TLS ows in our training
dataset and could help understand the dierence between the two
classes. For the visualization we used an autoencoder with 2-neuron
code, 512-neuron hidden layer, 86 inputs, and 86-neuron output
layer, trained with the normalized ow features in the training data.
We colored the ows according to the groundtruth. Several groups
of ows are visible, with malicious/benign overlapping in some of
the groups. Note that this does not necessarily apply to the detector,
which will use more dimensions for classication and will possibly
be able to distinguish the 2D-overlapping groups.
3 DETECTION AND EVASION
3.1 DNN detector
e detector used throughout the paper is an 86 input, 3-layer
fully connected neural network with 2048/1024/512 ReLU activated
neurons with 0.2 Dropout layer, and an 2-neuron Somax activation
output layer. e training uses the Adam optimizer with categorical
crossentropy loss. e model has +2.8M parameters. We assume
this is a generic neural network structure that can be plausibly used
by anyone building a neural network-based detector.
3.2 FGSM whitebox attack with
domain-specic restrictions
With the Fast Gradient Sign Method [8] we take a malicious C2
ow, compute the gradient of the detector’s loss with regard to
the input ow, and take a xed length step ϵ for each feature, in
the direction of the gradient, x∗ = x + ϵ siдn(∇x (θ ,x ,y)). We use
CleverHans [13] to implement this aack.
Table 4 denes three subsets of aack features that can be modi-
ed given our assumptions about what the aacker can change in
the C2 ow. Set 1 is for an aack that only changes the duration of
the aack; set 2 is for an aack that in addition to duration changes
3hp://tstat.polito.it/measure.shtml#log tcp complete
Core Set Features 3-14, 17-28, 31-37
3-6 ; 17-20 Total, RST, ACK, pure ACK
packet counts
7 ; 21 Unique bytes
8-9 ; 22-23 Data segment and byte counts
10-11 ; 24-25 Retransmied data segment
and byte counts
12 ; 26 Out of sequence segment counts
13-14 ; 27-28 SYN and FIN packet counts
31 Flow Duration
32 ; 33 Rel. time of rst payload
34 ; 35 Rel. time of last payload
36 ; 37 Relative time of rst ACK
TCP End to End Features 45-58
45-48 ; 52-55 Av., min., max., st.dev. RTT
49 ; 56 RTT observation counts
45-51 ; 57-58 Maximum and minimum TTL
TCP Options Features 65-79,83,85,90-104,106-109
65-66 Window scale, timestamp
options sent (C2S)
67 ; 90 Scaling values negotiated
68-69 ; 91-92 SACK option set, SACK counts
70-72 ; 93-95 MSS declared, max. and min. MSS values
73-74 ; 96-97 Max. and min. receiver
window announced
75 ; 98 zero receiver window counts
76-78 ; 99-101 Max., min., initial congestion window
79 ; 102 Retransmied by timeout counts/RTO
103 Retransmied by 3 dup-ack
counts/FR (S2C)
104 Packet reordering counts (S2C)
106 Unknown packet counts (S2C)
107 Probe the receiver window
counts (S2C)
85 ; 108 Unnecessary retransmission
counts by RTO
109 Unnecessary retransmission
counts by FR (S2C)
TCP Layer 7 Features 114,115,120-122
114 ; 115 Push-separated message counts
120 Client TLS session ID reuse
121 ; 122 Rel. time of last packet
before rst TLS App. record
Table 3: TStat features used to characterize ows. We
use C2S ; S2C feature range notation to represent client-to-
server and server-to-client feature indices.
the total number of bytes and packets; set 3 is the Tstat Core set
without 4 features that measure timings at the beginning of the
ow, which falls out of our assumptions for the aacker.
For each adversarial sample generated by the iterative FGSM
method we take two additional steps: 1) only modify the values of
the original samples for the aack features; 2) only use the values
of the aack features if they are larger than the their corresponding
3
Figure 2: Boxplot of the 86 normalized ow features in the training set, for malicious (C2) and normal (Non-C2) TLS ows.
Figure 3: Visualization of the MTA training dataset.
values in the original sample, which is valid for counter features
like bytes, packets, and ow duration and because the practical
aack cannot decrease packets, byte counts, and duration of the
ows.
3.3 Proxy-based craing of longer ows
e proxy-based aack in this paper considers a proxy deployed by
the aacker with the purpose of altering the characteristics of the
C2 TLS ows. To change the total duration of the ow, the proxy
withholds the nal TCP FIN packets for the intended amount of
Attacker feature set Feature indices
Set 1 – Duration 31
Set 2 – Basic 31, 3/17 (all packets), 9/23 (all bytes)
Set 3 – Core Core set features
except 32-33 and 36-37
Table 4: Attack features
time. To change the number of packets and bytes, the proxy injects
additional packets with the desired number of bytes. If the proxy is
deployed in both ends (payload on the victim side and C2 server
on the aacker side) then both client and server packet and byte
count can be increased. In order to generate the adversarial sample
the proxy captures the C2 ow packets and, once the nal TCP FIN
packet is received, sends the packets to Tstat and obtains the ow
statistics that are input to FGSM.
To have a sense of real impact on all features we implemented the
adversarial aack on the duration feature by modifying the MTA
packet trace les as follows. Using scapy we modify the timestamp
of the last four packets of the ow according to the adversarial
sample, in practice causing a delay at the end of the ow that
increases ow duration. e original features of the C2 ows are
fed to FGSM, and the target adversarial duration feature value is
de-normalized by squaring and multiplying by the maximum value.
Figure 4 illustrates this process.
3.4 Detection and Evasion Performance
Table 5 shows accuracy, precision and recall results for detection
and evasion. We take the original malicious samples, change their
4
pcap trace file
C2 TLS
modified pcap trace file
Tstat
Original 
Features
Tstat
“Real” 
Adversarial 
Features
client server
... adversarial C2 TLS
original 
duration
adversarial 
duration
insert 
delay
Adv. 
Algorithm
“Theoretical” 
Adversarial 
Features
Figure 4: Obtaining adversarial examples from trac modi-
cation by changing ow duration
value according to each of the aacks, and then assess performance
on a data set consisting of the original benign samples and the
modied malicious samples.
Accuracy Precision 1 - Recall
(Aack
Success)
Original 95.0% 92.7% 2.7%
Adv. All Features +/- 50.1% 39.5% 95.0%
Adv. Duration +/- 67.7% 84.3% 58.8%
Adv. Duration + 79.0% 89.4% 35.5%
Craed Duration + 83.1% 90.2% 26.1%
2x Duration + 93.9% 92.6% 4.9%
5x Duration + 68.1% 84.6% 57.9%
10x Duration + 63.9% 81.3% 66.7%
20x Duration + 58.1% 73.7% 78.6%
100x Duration + 51.6% 51.3% 91.9%
Adv. Set 2 +/- 64.7% 82.1% 65.0%
Adv. Set 2 + 67.6% 84.3% 58.9%
Adv. Set 2 client +/- 67.2% 84.0% 59.7%
Adv. Set 2 client + 71.4% 86.5% 51.2%
Adv. Set 2 server +/- 60.5% 77.6% 73.5%
Adv. Set 2 server + 70.3% 85.9% 53.3%
Adv. Set 3 +/- 54.3% 64.2% 86.3%
Adv. Set 3 + 55.6% 68.1% 83.7%
Adv. Set 3 client +/- 58.8% 75.0% 77.0%
Adv. Set 3 client + 64.3% 81.8% 65.7%
Adv. Set 3 server +/- 54.0% 63.2% 86.9%
Adv. Set 3 server + 54.4% 64.4% 86.1%
Table 5: Detection and evasion results. According to the at-
tack we label the data ’+/-’ if the feature values can be both
increased anddecreased, and ’+’ if the feature values are only
increased. ’client’ and ’server’ indicate whether the attack
modied client or server features.
Aer training the DNN classier on theMTA dataset we achieved
a 95.0% accuracy on the test data, with 2.7% malicious ows and
7.3% normal ows misclassied. Running a single iteration FGSM
with ϵ = 0.3 and allowing for changes in any feature increases
misclassied malicious ows to 95.0%. If we restrict the changes
to the duration feature but allow decreasing ow duration (which
is out of scope for our assumptions), misclassied malicious ows
drop to 58.8%. If we keep under our assumptions and only allow
increasing ow duration, then misclassied malicious ows drop to
35.5%. Although a 35.5% success at evading the classier seems low,
it causesmore than 10 timesmoremalicious ows to bemisclassied
than originally, for a relatively simple aack. Finally, if we consider
the changes in the pcap le described in gure 4, this value further
drops to 26.1%. e aack is slightly less eective when actually
implementing it in the packet traces likely because other features
are modied by the shi in packet timestamps done in the aack –
e.g. the RTT features.
We compared the FGSM duration aack with even simpler at-
tacks that double – or multiply by x – the duration of the malicious
ow and don’t have to obtain ow features other than duration nor
apply the FGSM method. We observe that larger percentages of
malicious ows are misclassied with larger duration multiplica-
tion factor. For 100x duration we get 91.9% misclassied malicious
ows; however, in gure 5 we can see from the CDF of the ow
durations for aacks x10, x20, and x100 that these ows are much
larger than episolon = 0.3, which is the maximum increase caused
by our FGSM duration aacks. In particular for x100 duration is
1.0 in practically all ows. Although increasing duration does not
have a direct cost, for C2 that is repetitive and frequently opens
and closes TLS connections it may lower the frequency with which
the malware contacts the C2 server.
Figure 5: Increased duration CDF for simple duration multi-
plication attack. Legend values are the factor multiplied by
the original duration.
Using more features than just duration – such as those in sets 2
and 3 in table 4 – appears to improve the aack performance, as
expected given the high level of performance we observe by using
all features. Set 2 (with increase of feature value only) has 58.9%
misclassied malicious ows which is similar to the 5x duration
aack; set 3 (also with increase of feature value only) has 83.7%
misclassied malicious ows which is larger than the 20x duration
aack. Notice that both set 2 and set 3 aacks only add up to +0.3 to
the normalized features in the set, whereas from gure 5 most 20x
ows have maximum normalized duration (1.0). We also observe
that a penalty is implied if it is only possible to modify the client- or
server-side features. e notable exception is for server-side feature
set 3 which appears to perform as well as the full set – both with
increasing and decreasing feature values or only with increasing
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feature values. is would call for seing up the proxy at the C2
server.
4 HARDENING THE DETECTOR
In this section we try to understand not only to which extent hard-
ening the detector is possible (we expect it is given prior work on
adversarial learning) but especially how robust a model hardened
with adversarial samples from a given aack is against adversarial
samples from other aacks, considering the ow-specic limita-
tions in the set of features in the aacks. To harden the detector
we take the original data set and extend it with adversarial samples.
We train the hardened model on the extended training data set
and assess the performance of the hardened detector on both the
original and the adversarial test data.
4.1 Robustness against other adversarial
samples
Table 6 shows hardening and aacking results for some of the
feature sets in table 5. e small values in the matrix diagonal in
the table shows us that all hardened models, having been trained
on adversarial samples with a given feature set, are robust to a test
set of adversarial samples of the same feature set. e following
paragraphs provide a read-though and analysis of the non-diagonal
elements of the matrix.
Analysis – aack performance. Using all features (Adv. All Fea-
tures +/-, column 1) yields by far the best – although impracticable
under our assumptions – aack; the only model that is robust to
this aack is the model that is hardened with this dataset. Feature
set 3 aacks (columns 10-13) are themselves successful in aacking
models hardened with the other feature sets (rows 1-9). Notice that
Adv. Set 3 server +, column 12 causes large percentages of misclas-
sied malicious trac on most detectors except those hardened
with datasets using feature set 3; it falls under our assumption that
the proxy is only able to increment counters like packets, bytes,
and duration; and it only requires deployment at the server side –
making it a good candidate for successful aacks to these models.
Analysis – model robustness. Adversarial samples from feature set
3 (rows 10-13) do not seem adequate for hardening detectors against
other adversarial samples. In fact, most aacks are consistently
successful against models hardened with any of the feature sets 3
adversarial samples – except aacks using feature set 3 itself. e
detector hardened with all features (row 1) is surprisingly poorly
resistant to all other aacks. Feature set 2-hardened models seem
to be robust against both duration and feature set 2 aacks. One
reason why feature set 2-hardened models are robust to duration
aacks may be because of the weight of the duration feature in the
feature set 2 compared to feature set 3 where there are much more
features and the impact of duration changes may be diluted.
Analysis – impact on aack performance of only increasing feature
values. Only increasing feature values causes a small yet relatively
consistent drop in misclassication of malicious ows. Table 6 has
3 cases where we can compare the performance of aacks using
the same features sets – each case with one feature set where the
FGSM-suggested feature values can be added or subtracted from
the original values, and another where they can only be added.
ese are columns 2 and 3, 6 and 7, and 10 and 11. Models hardened
with adversarial ows whose feature values can be larger or smaller
than the original ow also consistently perform beer than their
increase-limited counterparts. One exception is for feature set 3,
whose Adv. Set 3 + hardened model fares beer than its Adv. Set 3
+/- counterpart.
4.2 Non-adversarial
While the defender may prepare for an adversarial aack like the
one described in the paper and deploy one of the hardened models,
it is possible that the aacker chooses not to deploy any adversarial
aack – not altering malware trac. In this case we test on the
original MTA dataset and observe that all hardenedmodels decrease
accuracy, precision, and recall, but only slightly, when compared
to the original model. From original model values of 95% accuracy,
92.7% precision, and 2.7% aack success rate (1-recall), no hardened
model drops below 91% accuracy and 86% precision nor goes above
6% aack success rate (1-recall).
5 ITERATIVELY ATTACKING AND
HARDENING
In this section we try to understand to which extent a model hard-
ened with adversarial samples from one iteration is robust against
samples from another iteration. Figure 6 illustrates our approach,
where defender and aacker use the same iterative approach but
where the defender and aacker may independently choose dif-
ferent iterations for hardened model (defender) and adversarial
samples (aacker) respectively.
To incrementally aack and harden the detectors we train a de-
tector, at each iteration, with three dierent options for datasets: A)
use original benign ows and the adversarial ows of the previous
iteration (original malicious ows if rst iteration); B) use original
benign and malicious ows together with the adversarial ows of
the previous iteration (none if rst iteration); C) original benign
and malicious ows together with the adversarial ows of all prior
iterations (none if rst iteration). While training options A and B
have xed training size, option C has increasing training size and
may not be sustainable for large number of iterations and large
datasets. In the three cases we use all features for the adversarial
aack. Table 7 shows the resilience to adversarial aacks on models
hardened in dierent iterations.
Hardening-loop option C is robust against adversarial aacks
at any iteration; this points to C being the best defense, although
with growing datasets and iterations this option may be impractical.
Option A yields hardened models that are not able to detect the
original malicious ows (cf. MTA column) – given that the training
dataset for this option at each iteration only includes benign ows
and adversarial ows from the previous iteration. Option B is able
to detect original malicious ows and has xed training set size. For
option B we observe that, unlike C, no hardened model is robust
against the adversarial samples of all iterations, raising a level
playing eld problem for the defender and aacker. Depending on
the iterations that aacker and defender independently choose for
their hardened model and adversarial samples, a more successful
aack or defense will take place.
We notice that for options B and C and at some iterations the
adversarial aack is not successful – for example option B iteration
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Index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Adv. All Features +/- 1 0.1% 36.0% 36.1% 84.6% 97.6% 45.2% 35.0% 47.8% 25.1% 64.0% 54.4% 91.1% 37.7%
Adv. Duration +/- 2 91.7% 1.5% 2.7% 0.6% 0.2% 2.5% 7.2% 10.9% 2.5% 82.8% 81.3% 71.2% 38.3%
Adv. Duration + 3 95.2% 9.4% 1.6% 0.3% 0.2% 17.5% 11.6% 12.5% 5.9% 80.2% 70.1% 91.1% 26.8%
20x Duration 4 94.8% 9.2% 4.4% 0.1% 0.1% 34.5% 23.6% 16.1% 15.4% 73.0% 67.3% 91.2% 32.4%
100x Duration 5 95.8% 7.5% 5.9% 3.0% 0.2% 40.2% 29.9% 16.9% 21.2% 86.4% 80.1% 91.5% 46.4%
Adv. Set 2 +/- 6 93.4% 2.9% 3.6% 0.8% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.7% 0.7% 64.6% 55.0% 88.5% 11.3%
Adv. Set 2 + 7 94.0% 5.7% 3.3% 1.2% 0.4% 1.4% 0.3% 1.1% 0.8% 82.0% 69.0% 96.9% 23.9%
Adv. Set 2 server + 8 95.2% 17.4% 2.5% 0.7% 0.4% 19.0% 10.3% 0.7% 23.3% 86.3% 74.5% 79.2% 51.4%
Adv. Set 2 client + 9 93.6% 3.9% 2.0% 0.4% 0.3% 4.0% 1.3% 12.4% 0.4% 78.6% 68.6% 87.8% 11.8%
Adv. Set 3 +/- 10 78.7% 39.6% 35.1% 86.4% 98.8% 56.0% 50.5% 33.0% 48.9% 0.2% 0.1% 11.8% 6.1%
Adv. Set 3 + 11 87.2% 30.9% 28.5% 78.8% 97.4% 26.5% 16.1% 27.5% 12.0% 0.6% 0.1% 5.0% 3.1%
Adv. Set 3 server + 12 96.3% 32.8% 22.5% 52.7% 69.1% 41.9% 32.3% 16.9% 33.1% 26.0% 7.7% 0.2% 61.1%
Adv. Set 3 client + 13 92.2% 28.6% 27.9% 16.5% 11.7% 30.9% 16.3% 38.3% 7.1% 36.5% 19.7% 92.6% 0.4%
Table 6: Percentage of adversarial ows generated with attack feature set (column) that are misclassied by a model hardened
with another attack feature set (row). Same index for attack in column and hardened model in row.
Hardened Model
(Iteration i)
Dataset
(Iteration i)
Train
Merge
(Opts. 
A,B,C)
FGSM
Adv. Samples
(Iteration i)
Iteration i=i+1
Bootstrap/ 
iteration 0: 
MTA dataset
Attacker chooses 
adv. sample 
iteration (col.)
Defender chooses 
hardened model 
iteration (row)
Figure 6: Attack and hardening iterative approach. e boot-
strap at iteration 0 starts with the MTA dataset that aer
training yields the iteration 0 model which is the original
non-hardened model.
3 hardened model only misclassies 8.9% of the adversarial ows
obtained by directly applying FGSM to its model (row Adv. 4); most
other models are vulnerable to their adversarial aacks (bold and
italic entries in the table). is may be a problem for the aacker
since the aack at that iteration is ineective, and for the defender
because the next iteration model hardening does not increase or
decrease robustness against this aack. We also notice that all
adversarial samples are successful against the original model (cf.
Original rows), and that models seem to be yield low misclassied
adversarial ows against adversarial aacks not only of the current
iteration but also of the next iteration.
e most important thing to notice here is probably that under
this aacking-hardening loop and depending on the strategy for
reusing data (A,B,C) there can be a level playing eld between at-
tacker and defender where winning is not simply hardening your
model as much as you can  or geing the adversarial samples
from the most hardened models  if you dont know how many
iterations your opponent decided to do in their aacking-hardening
loop. For example in option B the Adv. Iter 5 row performs accept-
ably for adversarial samples 3, 4, and 5 but not for samples 2 and 1,
nor even for the original MTA. is underpins the non-monotonic
variation of values in the same rows or columns in table 7.
6 RELATEDWORK
Rule- and black-list-based detectors can be complemented by statis-
tical detectors based on trac characteristics. Statistical detectors
can use packet byte-streams [12, 17], ow features [2], packet and
TLS record count and sizes [1], and combinations thereof as input
data. As these techniques are further developed we expect dierent
network managers to deploy dierent solutions or sets of solutions.
Adversarial techniques generate samples in the input space of the
classier that increase misclassication and going from classier
input space to actual trac may be simple – as in the case of gen-
erating a sequence of packets with given size – or more complex
if the input space imposes constraints in the values and if there
are limitations to the extent to which the original malicious trac
can be changed. In this paper we focus on ow features; we expect
e.g. packet byte-streams to be even harder to generate abiding to
constraints but easier to break because the detector has more inputs
that can be modied by an aacker. Recent work has focused on
generating real packet trac [5, 11] and network ows [15] to im-
prove datasets used in malware trac detection using Generative
Adversarial Networks. e ow-based approach relies entirely on
the GAN to generate adversarial ows, yet it may be impossible to
cra such a ow. Furthermore these papers do not consider any
limitations on modifying malware to support adversarial aacks
without altering the intended malicious behavior of the malware.
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A MTA Adv.1 Adv.2 Adv.3 Adv.4 Adv.5
Original 2.7% 95.0% 93.6% 97.0% 99.8% 94.9%
Mod. Iter 1 5.7% 0.1% 93.1% 23.6% 0.0% 93.4%
Mod. Iter 2 99.8% 0.1% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 12.4%
Mod. Iter 3 100.0% 97.6% 0.1% 0.1% 91.7% 40.4%
Mod. Iter 4 100.0% 18.0% 99.9% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Mod. Iter 5 100.0% 71.8% 35.2% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
B MTA Adv.1 Adv.2 Adv.3 Adv.4 Adv.5
Original 2.7% 95.0% 92.1% 100.0% 98.0% 99.5%
Mod. Iter 1 5.1% 0.1% 90.2% 2.9% 0.1% 32.5%
Mod. Iter 2 4.6% 0.1% 0.2% 59.7% 0.1% 78.6%
Mod. Iter 3 2.9% 85.4% 0.1% 0.1% 8.9% 32.1%
Mod. Iter 4 4.2% 25.4% 59.8% 0.1% 0.1% 32.9%
Mod. Iter 5 8.0% 18.4% 55.3% 1.3% 0.1% 0.2%
C MTA Adv.1 Adv.2 Adv.3 Adv.4 Adv.5
Original 2.7% 95.0% 99.5% 90.2% 91.1% 65.9%
Mod. Iter 1 3.3% 0.2% 99.5% 59.5% 95.4% 27.9%
Mod. Iter 2 4.8% 0.1% 0.1% 14.3% 0.4% 10.2%
Mod. Iter 3 8.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.2%
Mod. Iter 4 3.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 3.0%
Mod. Iter 5 4.9% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0%
Table 7: Percentage of adversarial ows generated at given
iteration (column) that are misclassied by a model hard-
ened with another iteration (row). A, B, C: training option
for hardening, details in text. Original model in rst row of
A, B, and C.
e packet-based approaches consider some constraints on the
structure of the packet but for ow detectors in particular the abil-
ity of a sequence of adversarial GAN-generated packets that are
misclassied by a packet detector to yield a ow whose statisti-
cal features are also misclassied by a ow detector has not been
studied.
[7] surveys command and control trac detection systems as
well as aacks to these systems – and identify high-level issues
including the diculty of modifying features in C2 trac and dier-
ent aack techniques such as poisoning and evasion. In this paper
we only consider evasion aacks. Although [7] looks at dierent
aspects of security for machine learning there are few surveyed
examples of actual C2 trac detection and evasion issues. e
following are three examples of recent work that takes on the chal-
lenge of aacking C2 trac detection systems. [14] describes the
use of a GAN to generate adversarial samples that are able to break
CTU’s Stratosphere IDS. e paper takes an open-source malware
and re-codes it so that it supports adversarial samples from the
GAN specifying total ow duration and bytes, as well as delay to
the next ow. Although the paper is interesting and shows the
point of how easy it is to break an IDS, it has signicant dierences
to our work: the detector is not a ow detector but a 3-tuple (victim
IP, C2 server IP, C2 server port) detector with features that are
not applicable to individual ows, and it makes the assumption
that the malware trac can be modied to support any adversarial
feature suggested by the GAN generator, which we do not. More in
line with our assumptions about the extent to which C2 trac can
be modied, [4] analyzes how ow-based detectors can be evaded
by adding a xed amount to the duration, source and destination
byte counts, and total packet counts of the original C2 ow. It uses
CTU’s 2013 dataset to train a random forest classier and to show
the performance of their aack. [9] tries to bridge the gap between
feature space aacks and their viability in what they call trac
space – meaning the set of ow feature values that are feasible
network-wise and for a given aack. ey use a GAN to generate
adversarial samples and an optimization procedure to bring the
adversary samples close to the misclassication boundary; then
they perform trac mutation to automatically nd trac-space
vectors that are close to the adversarial sample. ey then harden
a detector with the adversarial, trac-space samples.
Unlike the work we review in this section, in this paper we
focus specically on encrypted malware command and control
trac rather than non-C2 aack trac or non-encrypted C2 trac.
Moreover, while most related work assesses the performance of
the aack on a detector and some work hardens the detector, they
do not consider the impact of dierent feature sets used in the
adversarial aack nor of dierent hardening iterations.
Finally, for non-network related data, a conceptually similar
work [10] addresses evasion of PDF malware detection where the
authors show that manipulating a small subset of suitable features
is eective against a random forest classier in a black-box seing.
ey insert dummy content that is ignored by PDF renderers but
aects feature values and analyze the impact of dierent aack
scenarios on the detection rate. Analysis of using adversarial ex-
amples for hardening led to similar ndings to those in section 4
with respect to the eectiveness of this kind of defense, but does
not explore the aack and hardening loop approach of 3 – and does
not focus on network trac.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we assessed the performance of evasion aacks and of
hardening detector models under the assumption that the malware
should maintain its original behavior. For that purpose we use a
public source of malware trac captures to build a labeled dataset
from which both defenders and aackers can train and aack C2
encrypted trac detector models. We show the impact of the
practical limitations on a specic aack that we implement on
the packet traces, with increasing misclassication of adversarial
samples. We then harden the detector with dierent feature set
adversarial samples. Assuming that the detector does not know
which feature set the aacker uses and that the aacker does not
know which feature set the defender uses to harden the detector,
we look for combinations of feasible aacks and models that would
either make it impossible for the aacker to win or impossible for
the defender to win. We nd that an aack that allows adding or
subtracting adversarial values from all original features is the best
aack – but is not implementable under our aacker assumptions –
yet does not yield the best hardened models at large. Finally, we try
to understand the same issues for dierent iterations of aacking
and hardening a model. We nd out that it is feasible to reach
a level playing eld where for a given number of iterations and
a given training set strategy no hardened model is able to detect
the aacks of all iterations nor can an aack cause detectors at all
iterations to misclassify a large part of its adversarial samples.
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We intend to implement the proxy-based aacks for feature sets
2 and 3 both from client and server size, test the performance and
impact on feature set- and iteration-hardening of other adversarial
learning methods, and build and use a more extensive C2 encrypted
data set. We also plan to extend this work to other input data –
including packet sizes, TLS records, and packet byte-streams.
To ease the reproducibility of results we can share parts of our
code on-demand – although most of what is needed is available
publicly: the MTA dataset, Tstat, and the Cleverhans adversarial
learning framework; the learning models are very simply and easy
to code using e.g. Kereas and Tensorow.
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